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Abstract. Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly
deployed for missions that are deemed dangerous or impractical to per-
form by humans in many military and disaster scenarios. UAVs in a team
need to operate in sub-groups or independently to perform specific tasks,
but still synchronise state information regularly and cope with intermit-
tent communication failures as well as permanent UAV failures. This
paper describes a failure management scheme that copes with failures,
which may result in disjoint sub-networks within the team. A commu-
nication management protocol is proposed to control UAVs performing
disconnected individual operations, while maintaining the team’s struc-
ture by trying to ensure that all members of the mission rendezvous to
communicate at intermittent intervals. The evaluation of the proposed
approaches shows that the schemes are scalable and perform significantly
better than similar centralised approaches.
Key words: Autonomic management, collaborating autonomous vehi-
cles, mission management, communication failure recovery.
1 Introduction
Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) are mobile robots that are often used
in civilian disaster relief missions and military scenarios to reconnoiter in ar-
eas which are dangerous or impractical for humans. A challenge in using UAVs
for such missions is enabling adaptive self-management so that they can auto-
matically adapt to changes in context and failures without human intervention.
Collaborating UAVs form a Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [17], a general architec-
tural pattern for realising self management of individual and teams of UAVs.
An SMC team consists of multiple UAVs with at least one commander, which
could be a human or another UAV. The commander is provided with a mission
specification by its command base and assembles the required UAVs to perform
the mission. The mission specification defines how specific roles are assigned to
certain UAVs based on their credentials and capabilities.
The mission specification defines a role management hierarchy and the be-
haviour of these roles in terms of policies specified using the Ponder2 [15] policy
specification language. When a mission is instantiated the commander will down-
load its role behaviour specifications (the policies) and start the mission. When
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new UAVs come into the communication range the commander gives a subset of
the mission specification to those UAVs which have satisfied the vetting process
with respect to capability and credentials. These UAVs may in turn allocate a
subset of the mission roles to other UAVs and the whole process finally results
in a formation of a management tree which facilitates control and state informa-
tion collection. Table 1 shows examples of role assignment policies. In the first
policy the commander authenticates a newly discovered UAV, and assigns it to
a surveyor role if it has the required capability with respect to motion and video
camera. In the second policy the commander performs reassignment if the failed
role type is a surveyor role.
policy event: /event/newUAV;
condition:[:summary :uav|
root/discovery uav: uav
has: #("motion" "video")
cap: summary
auth: credential];
action: [ :name :uav |
root/discovery fullCapReq:uav
role:"surveyor"].
policy event: /event/UAVFailure;
condition:[:role|
role=="surveyor"];
action: [ :role |
root/role/commander
reassign:role
scheme:"default".].
Table 1. Ponder2 policies for role assignment and reassignment
To ensure that the UAVs comprising the SMC perform their tasks correctly,
it is important to cope with different types of failures. Consider a mission sce-
nario that contains the following roles: a Commander (C), which has the initial
mission specification, assigns roles and manages the SMC; an Aggregator (A),
which receives information from surveyors and builds up a map, a Surveyor (S)
containing a video camera, and a Relay (R) which maintains communication
by relaying messages in an ad-hoc network. Failures in such missions can occur
as a result of intermittent or permanent communication link failures as well as
individual node failure. A recent study on UAV failures [5] shows that reliability
in field environment is only between 6 and 20 hours.
This paper extends the initial mission management presented in [7] by pre-
senting an evaluation of the proposed schemes and elaborating the management
architecture. This architecture uses a management tree (described in Section
3.1) to define management hierarchies as well as data aggregation hierarchies
during execution of the mission. If the periodic state information is not received
within a specified timeout period, a failure is considered to have occurred. Vari-
ous timeouts can differentiate between the types of failures and each is handled
accordingly.
In conjunction with failure management, we also actively try to maintain
communication between team members using two techniques: i) UAVs adapt
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their movement to always be within radio range of a neighbour or follow each
other (similar to [1, 4, 18, 12, 16]) so as to maintain communication by using
UAVs as relays to reach distant nodes; ii) The UAVs gather within a defined
rendezvous area at a specified time so as to exchange the requisite state infor-
mation (this is due to the fact that it may be impractical to restrict motion in
some situations and so we take a delay tolerant network approach to cater for
UAVs being out of communication range for short periods). In the event that
a UAV is unable to reach the rendezvous area, it is assumed to have failed and
the appropriate failure management scheme is used.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details the protocol
to ensure secure communication within the team. Section 3 details the failure
management scheme, while Section 4 details the communication management
scheme. Section 5 details the experiments and the ensuing results. Section 6
compares our approach with related work. Section 7 concludes the paper and
provides ideas for future work.
2 Security
The UAVs forming a team can change over time with new UAVs joining or
leaving the team. These UAVs may also belong to different organisations (e.g.
allies). Authenticating a UAV before it joins the team and protecting the en-
suing communication is thus necessary to ensure the security of the mission.
We assume the coalition between different organisations is achieved by using a
Central Command Centre (C3) and use the Certificate Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (C-PKI) [10] to ensure authentication, confidentiality and message integrity.
The system assumes a single certification authority (C3), which issues certified
public/private keys to all UAVs in the mission.
The C-PKI system is also used to exchange a common secret key generated
using the Diffie-Hellman protocol [6] between each member of the team and the
commander. The secret key effectively establishes a secure channel between the
commander and each team member. The steps involved in the authentication
between a UAV (A) and the Commander (or any other manager role performing
discovery) (C) are shown below:
1. C → A: {Cid}. Broadcast Discovery Message.
2. A → C: {Join Request, Aid, NonceA}. A sends a request to join the SMC.
3. C → A: Sign
{
{Kc}K−1
C3
, Cid, NonceA + 1
}
K
−1
c
. C authenticates itself to
A by sending its Public-Key Certificate (PKC) and a function applied to
NonceA, all signed with its private key.
4. A → C: Sign
{
{Ka}K−1
C3
, Aid, NonceA + 2
}
K
−1
a
. A sends its PKC to C as
well as a function applied to the received Nonce, all signed by its private key.
If the certificates are verified by both A and C (using C3’s certificate), mutual
authentication is achieved.
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5. C →A: Sign
{
{gx mod p}Ka , g, p,NonceC
}
K
−1
c
. C sends the Diffie-Hellman
parameters and keyshare encrypted with A’s public key.
6. A → C: Sign
{
{gy mod p}Kc , NonceC + 1
}
K
−1
a
. A sends its Diffie-Hellman
keyshare, encrypted with C’s public key.
Both A and C can now calculate a shared secret key (Kac) that is used to
establish a secure channel between A and C. The rest of the communication
uses the secure channel established above.
3 Failure Management
3.1 Management Tree
The UAVs in a mission are arranged in the form of a management tree during
the role assignment process to facilitate decentralising discovery and role man-
agement as any of the UAVs in the tree could potentially perform discovery and
role assignment. This tree is used for defining management hierarchies as well as
for data aggregation during execution of the mission. Using a hierarchical role
assignment scheme allows us to perform optimisation on the set of discovered
UAVs in the window of time that every role assignment is performed. Consider
a mission scenario with five UAVs, three hierarchies and five roles in the man-
agement tree. Role C is at the top, roles P, Q and R are managed by C and roles
S and T are managed by P. Because roles P, Q and R have to be assigned by C
before P assigns S and T, C can optimise the assignment by choosing the better
suited UAVs for P, Q and R out of the five available UAVs without compromis-
ing future assignments because C has a knowledge of future roles to be assigned
by P. This is in contrast to a completely distributed task assignment scheme
used in architectures such as MURDOCH [8], where decisions are made based
only on the current and/or local situation without taking into account how the
decision might affect the future and/or global situation. In the following sec-
tions we present the management tree formation algorithms. Each UAV, upon
start-up runs the algorithm in Section 3.3. However, if the UAV is started as a
commander, it runs the Manager algorithm. In the event that a UAV becomes
a manager, it also runs the Manager algorithm (Section 3.2).
3.2 Manager UAV’s Algorithm
A manager role has a set of roles it is required to assign according to the mission
specification. When the role is started it prepares a waiting list (W ) containing
a set of roles to be assigned to UAVs : W = {R1,R2, ..., Rn} and a children list
(L) containing a set of assigned roles and their state information.
1. Broadcast ID periodically to discover other UAVs.
2. If a UAV replies with a join request the manager initiates a mutual authenti-
cation process which, if successful, will result in a shared secret key between
the managing and managed UAVs. If the authentication is not successful
return to step 1.
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3. Authenticated UAV sends an encrypted capability summary s, check if there
is any role in W with a role assignment policy specifying a capability re-
quirement r, where r ⊆ s. If there is such a role then send a request for a
full capability description to the UAV.
4. Check if the full capability description satisfies the requirements of the role
and if so send a role assignment message to the UAV. Remove the assigned
role from W and add it to L.
5. If a state update message is received, update L.
6. Check L for freshness of role state information. If the age of the state of
a role is higher than a given interval of time then publish an appropriate
failure event (the event could be communication link failure or UAV failure
event based on the age of the state). Return to step 5.
For each UAV which has responded to the broadcast, steps 2-4 of the above
algorithm execute in parallel.
3.3 Managed UAV’s Algorithm
1. Wait for broadcast.
2. If a broadcast message is received and if this UAV can be assigned to a role,
send a join request to the broadcaster.
3. If authentication is initiated by the broadcaster, then perform mutual au-
thentication. If the authentication is successful, send an encrypted capability
summary to the broadcaster else return to step 1.
4. If a full capability request from the broadcaster is received within a given
timeout then send the encrypted description else return to step 1.
5. If a role assignment message is received within a given timeout then download
the policies specifying the behaviour of the role, start the role and identify
the broadcaster as the parent (manager) UAV else return to step 1.
6. Send a state update message to the manager UAV periodically.
Communication link
Discovery messages
Management link
UAV
UAV assigned to a role
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 1. Management Tree Formation
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Fig. 1 illustrates a trace of the tree formation algorithms in action. Fig.
1(a) shows the communication links between neighbouring nodes. In Fig. 1(b)
the top node broadcasts Discovery messages to its neighbours which eventually
form a team with the top node as commander and the middle nodes as children
assigned to various roles (Fig. 1(c)). In Fig. 1(d), the middle nodes broadcast to
their neighbours but only lower nodes respond as the other middle nodes already
have a parent. Fig. 1(e) shows the resulting tree with each node having a single
parent.
3.4 Failure Detection and Management
We categorise the possible types of failures into intermittent communication link
failures and permanent communication link or UAV node failures and differen-
tiate between them using timeouts. Each UAV periodically sends state infor-
mation to its parent in the management tree; if the state information is not
received within a specified timeout it is considered that a failure has occurred.
The timeouts are: (a) TC : detects intermittent communication link failure (b)
TN : detects permanent failures (TN > TC).
Failure of a communication link and/or a UAV causes partitioning of the
team as well as loss of functionality. We use a systematically defined identity for
UAVs to facilitate merging and re-joining of partitioned teams. The identity I
of a UAV is defined as: I = [M | H | S] where: M = mission ID, H = hierarchy
level and S = a numbering system to place all the UAVs in the management
tree in a total order. This identity lasts throughout the team configuration.
3.5 Intermittent Link Failure
An intermittent communication link failure may be caused by either a temporary
signal blockage by physical objects or movement out of the communication range.
Although local functions can keep operating, a temporary partitioning of the
logical (overlay) network over which the management tree is formed can cause
disruption of state aggregation as well as the flow of management commands. In
addition, remote operations will also be affected. The desired response to this
type of failure is to continue mission execution with disconnected operations and
resolve inconsistencies when the communication link reappears.
When the team is partitioned as a result of failure, one or more teams with-
out commanders will be formed. In order to keep the mission execution during
the failure, the top UAV on the hierarchy will become the commander of the
team (note that this UAV was already managing this sub-team during normal
functioning). A partitioned sub-team can also admit new UAVs. When the sub-
team rejoins the parent team, the sub-team commander reports its current state
to its parent and the domain structure of all UAVs in the mission is updated to
indicate new members. To facilitate merging of partitioned teams, we define the
hierarchy level of the partitioned team to be the level of its manager. Merging
is performed by placing lower-level hierarchy teams under the management of
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higher-level hierarchy teams. Ideally, when there are more UAVs to choose from,
more demanding mission subsets (ones with more roles) are given to more capa-
ble UAVs. Hence, we should keep more capable UAVs higher up in the hierarchy.
In this approach, there is no new role assignment or reassignment of existing
UAVs to roles different from their original ones. The result being, that the map-
ping of existing UAVs to roles remains the same whereas the management tree
can be different, as it is assumed that the adaptation is temporary. The initial
configuration is shown in Fig. 2(a). When communication link disconnection oc-
curs, as shown in Fig. 2(b), partitioned sub-teams are created. These sub-teams
perform reconfiguration where the partitioned role, H comes under the control
of the other sub-team as shown in Fig. 2(c).
(a) (b) (c)
(d)
C
A A
S S S H
(e)
H
C
A A A
S S S HH
C
A A A
S S S HH
C
A A A
S S S HH
C
A A A
S S S HH S
C
A A
S
S S
H
H
(f) (g)
C
A A A
S S H H
Fig. 2. Reconfiguration and Role Reassignment to Adapt to Failure
3.6 Permanent Failures
A permanent failure is caused by either a node or communication link hard-
ware failure (other UAVs cannot distinguish between these). The result is the
partitioning of the team as well as a loss of roles. The partitioning problem is
addressed using the approach in Section 3.5. The response to the loss of roles
is as follows (in order of priority): (i) use replicated roles, if available, (ii) if
there are newly arriving UAVs or previously discovered but unassigned UAVs,
perform a role reassignment, while keeping the existing team configuration, to
replace the lost role(s), and (iii) if none of the above is feasible, reconfigure the
team by swapping less crucial roles for more crucial roles. Should the reconfigu-
ration incur role replacement this takes place only in subsets of the team which
are lower in hierarchy than the failed UAV. This is due to the fact that roles
assigned to higher level UAVs are more crucial to the mission. In the case of role
reassignment and reconfiguration, state information migration takes place.
Fig. 2 illustrates adaptation to permanent failures. The initial configuration
is shown in Fig. 2(a). When a permanent failure occurs, as shown in Fig. 2(d),
partitioned sub-teams are created (Fig. 2(e)). The response to this problem
can be either reconfiguration as shown in Fig. 2(f), where the partitioned sub-
teams are moved up in the management hierarchy and now managed by the
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main commander; or a role replacement where the UAV which was previously
assigned to role S is now reassigned to the supposedly crucial role A as shown
in 2(g). All reconfigurations, reassignments and other responses are specified in
terms of policies.
4 Communication Management
In this section, we present our communication management protocol that tries to
maintain the communication links between the UAVs in the mission in order to
prevent communication link failure. We assume: (a) Each UAV knows its current
location and its direction and speed of travel, (b) No clock synchronisation,
but relative time is assumed to be consistent, for e.g. 20 minutes on one UAV
is more or less equal to 20 minutes on another, (c) All UAVs have the same
communication range (CR) and, (d) A global/local co-ordinate system exists for
specifying location and direction of travel. For the purpose of our schemes, we
augment the periodic state update messages (sent between the UAVs, as specified
by the management tree) by the current location and speed of the UAV.
4.1 Adapt Movement to Maintain Communication
In this section, we detail the approach that controls the movement of the UAVs
to ensure that they stay within communication range.
S
R
H
S’Φ
C A
(a)
Time = T H
S’
C A
S’’
R’
(b)
Time = T’
Fig. 3. Position of UAVs in the mission
Assume that the position at time T of the 5 UAVs in the mission are as
shown in Fig. 3(a). Starting at time T , UAV S starts to move from its current
location to its future location S′ with constant speed and direction (Φ). Since
the direction and speed of S are available to the rest of the UAVs in the team, it
is easy for them to predict the location of S at a later time (T ′). If this position
is beyond the communication range of the rest of the UAVs in the mission, the
closest UAV to S starts to move in a manner so as to make sure that it still is
within communication range of S. As per the scenario mentioned above, we can
see from Fig. 3(a) that UAV R is the closest to UAV S and it is R’s job to make
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sure S is within communication range and it moves accordingly. When S moves
to S′ at time T ′, R moves to R′ (Fig. 3(b)). The amount that R has to move
depends on its location and the location and speed of S.
If S moves from position S′ to S′′ during the next time period, then R would
also move to keep S within communication range. In the event that R along
with S move out of communication range with respect to the rest of the UAVs
in the group, the UAV closest to R will start following R to keep it within
communication range. If S keeps moving away, the rest of the UAVs try and
form a “chain” that allows them to keep S within communication range. If it is
not possible to cover S, the protocol uses the scheme described in Section 4.2.
4.2 Rendezvous to Restore Communication
Though the approach detailed in Section 4.1 allows UAVs involved in a mission
to maintain communication links, it would not be feasible in the scenario when
UAVs need to reconnoiter. In this section, we will detail the approach that
allows UAVs to perform disconnected individual operations, while maintaining
the team structure by trying to ensure that all members of the mission regardless
of destination or task, communicate at intermittent intervals.
If the commander UAV notices that the distance between a child node and
another member is greater than the range threshold (TR, modelled as a % of the
communication range (CR)), it initiates the rendezvous algorithm. Using the
current location, speed and direction of the UAVs in the mission, the rendezvous
area is calculated. This is where all the UAVs are expected to rendezvous after
a specified time. Once an instance of the rendezvous algorithm is running, fu-
ture requests are ignored. After reaching the rendezvous area, the algorithm is
restarted only if the need arises again.
The rendezvous area is calculated as follows. The average direction of travel
(θ) is calculated by averaging the angle of the direction of travel of all the UAVs
in the mission with respect to a common axis. Once the direction is calculated,
the rendezvous area is calculated to be the area (using a suitable expression)
surrounding the rendezvous point that is achieved by projecting the speed of the
slowest UAV starting from the average location (X , Y ) onto the average direc-
tion of travel over the requested time (T , which is relative to current time and
indicates the future time when the nodes should rendezvous). The rendezvous
point is calculated as follows (D = distance to rendezvous):
XRP , YRP =
{
XRP = X +D ∗ cosθ
YRP = Y +D ∗ sinθ
(1)
5 Experiments and Results
The experimental setup consisted of machines on the Local Area Network. We
simulated different subnets by using IP filter policies. Each manager role was
assigned to a separate machine and a different subnet, while other roles were
running in parallel (with a maximum of 20 roles per machine).
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5.1 Mission Setup Time
In this experiment we fixed the depth of the management tree to 5 levels and
compared its performance, with respect to mission setup time, with a centralised
approach by varying the number of roles in the mission. Fig. 4(a) shows the
result plotted with a 95% confidence interval. The result illustrates that as the
number of roles increases the hierarchical management approach outperforms
the centralised one.
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Fig. 4. Mission setup time
5.2 Effect of the Depth of the Management Tree
In this experiment we fixed the number of roles to 210 and varied the depth
of the management tree between 1 (centralised) and 10. We then measured the
time taken to setup the mission provided that UAVs consisting of all required
capabilities are available during the mission startup time. Fig. 4(b) shows that
the mission setup time decreases as we increase the depth of the tree as a result
of load balancing. However it starts to increase as the tree becomes very deep
due to the delay in role assignment created by an increase in the number of hops.
This behaviour suggests the existence of a ratio of number of roles to depth, for
a given management tree, which guarantees a minimal mission setup time.
5.3 Mean time to Reassign Roles after Failure
In this experiment we study the response time of our mission management sys-
tem when a cluster of failures occur, as in typical disaster response or military
scenarios it is likely that a group of UAVs could be affected by an event causing
them all to fail. We used a mission specification which has 100 Surveyor roles and
100 Aggregator roles and a reassignment policy which dictates that whenever a
Surveyor role fails an Aggregator role should be withdrawn from a working UAV
and replaced by a Surveyor role. The results are shown in Fig. 5. We note that
the reassignment time scales linearly with the number of failed nodes.
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Fig. 5. Measurement of Time Taken to Reassign Roles in a Cluster Failure Scenario
5.4 Evaluation of Communication Management
The communication management scheme was implemented using the Webots
mobile robotics simulator [14], which is a prototyping environment for modelling,
programming and simulating mobile robots. In the first experiment (Fig. 6(a)),
the effect of range threshold was evaluated with respect to the speed of the UAVs,
while the second experiment (Fig. 6(b)) evaluated the update time versus the
speed of the UAVs. The success rate is defined as the number of UAVs that
successfully manage to follow the lead UAV to its destination (including the
lead UAV itself). A total of five UAVs were used for this experiment and they
were arranged in a management tree with one commander, an aggregator, a
surveyor, a hazard detector and a relay. For the purpose of the experiments, the
relay was acting as the “lead” UAV. For the value of speed, a magnitude of 1
denotes a speed of 4.5 mm/s. For the first experiment, the update time is set to
2s, while for the second experiment, the range threshold is set to 75%.
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Fig. 6. Communication Management
From Fig. 6(a), we see that the range threshold (TR) has a significant impact
on the performance. As the value of TR increases, fewer and fewer UAVs are able
to follow the leader. This is especially true in the case when the speed is greater
than 30, since only the leader is able to reach its destination. Setting the value
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of TR much lower (50%) enables everyone to reach the destination, but this may
be detrimental since this results in the leader being followed very closely and
may result in a cluster failure (due to a hazardous terrain). Instead of setting
the value of TR apriori, it is ideal to set the value dynamically based on the
current speed. For lower speeds, a high value of TR would suffice and vice versa.
From Fig. 6(b), we can see that the change in update time adversely affects
the UAVs when they are travelling at a high speed. This is to be expected since
the “follower” UAV uses the location updates of its leader to map its path.
Having the update rate small (0.5s) results in all the UAVs following the leader
to the destination. However, this has an adverse effect on the battery life of the
UAVs due to the excess communication. From Fig. 6(b), we see that for a value
between 1.5 to 2 seconds, the protocol performs well. In case, we need to increase
the performance further, we can always decrease the value of TR, rather than
increasing the update time.
6 Related Work
A distributed algorithm that allows autonomous mobile robots with limited vis-
ibility to converge to a single point is suggested in [1]. This uses their previous
work in [2, 11] that allows the mobile robots to agree on a x−y coordinate system,
the common origin and the direction of the x-axis. This allows the mobile robots
to exchange their location information and use this information to converge to
a single point. The next position is calculated to be within the smallest region
containing the mobile robot and its neighbours. Similarly [13, 12] also addresses
the collective behaviour of a group of mobile autonomous agents and discusses
two different strategies that allow for mobile autonomous agents to rendezvous
at a specified location. Both strategies are “local” strategies, wherein each agent
independently calculates its new location based only on its neighbour informa-
tion. The first set of algorithms consists of strategies that depend on a common
synchronised clock between the mobile agents while the second set of algorithms
consists of strategies that do not depend on a synchronised clock.
The ideas and protocols provided above are similar to our idea of a rendezvous
area but our rendezvous algorithm is only executed as and when required. Also,
we do not restrict the movement of the UAVs since they are free to move in any
manner to reach the rendezvous area.
Co-ordinating the movement of the mobile robots to keep them within com-
munication range is discussed in [18, 9]. Although the ideas are similar to our
approach in Section 4.1, our robots do not keep following the lead robot, but
instead resort to the approach in Section 4.2 to maintain communication links.
In [3] the authors present an approach for exploration, mapping and tracking
targets using a large scale heterogeneous robots. They classify the robots based
on their capabilities as highly-capable, slightly less-capable and simple. The less
capable robots (leader robots) are responsible for leading the simple robots as
the simple robots do not have the navigation capability. The failure detection
approach is slightly similar to our approach in that the leader robot detecting the
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failure of the follower is comparable to a parent role detecting the failure of its
child. However, their approach to recovery is coded in the behaviour of the robots
while we use policies for managing failure. Also, whereas we use disconnected
operations in communication failure and reassignment in complete UAV failure;
in their approach the leader robots return home when communication failure
occurs and there is no defined action for a complete leader robot failure.
A system called Jamp [19] uses disconnected operations to handle communi-
cation link disconnections and defines an abstraction called container, in order
to facilitate the implementation of mobile applications. An application in Jamp
is implemented as an interaction between containers, since containers can be
moved from node to node. The container concept in the Jamp system and its
mobility is similar to our role concept. However, Jamp is not applicable for
communication link disconnections since it is not possible to transfer state infor-
mation to the newly instantiated container in another node. Our approach caters
for link disconnections by periodically collecting state information by using the
management tree.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a failure management scheme for teams of Un-
manned Autonomous Vehicles performing a mission using a hierarchical mission
management approach. We evaluated the performance of both the hierarchical
mission management system and the failure management scheme. The results
show that the mission management system is scalable and also has the advan-
tage of having a shorter mission setup time, especially for large scale missions,
as compared to a centralised management approach. The failure management
scheme scales linearly with the failed number of roles which makes it suitable
for large scale failures in difficult or dangerous mission areas.
We have also presented a communication maintenance scheme that tries to
maintain the communication links between the UAVs involved in the mission.
The proposed scheme was evaluated in the Webots simulator and the ensuing
results show that the scheme is robust and flexible.
Future work will focus in studying the response of the failure management
scheme by using different failure models. We also intend to study reconfigurations
of the mission management tree triggered by withdrawal of a role during a reas-
signment. Also, the approach to maintain communication using the rendezvous
algorithm will be implemented on the Webots simulator and evaluated.
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